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This paper considers two aspects of corporate tax avoidance or tax shelters.  First, it
considers measures of the welfare loss from corporate tax avoidance or tax shelters.  Second, it
considers how the tax rules themselves, as opposed to the audit and penalty structures, can be used
to limit shelters.  The claim underlying both discussions is that the primary problem facing policy
makers is not the standard evasion problem of determining optimal audit and penalty rates.  Instead,
the problem is determining which activities should be treated as allowable and which should not. 
The goal of this paper is to evaluate this problem using economic tools.  Section I sets forth the
problem as one of defining shelters, avoidance, and evasion rather than the typical economic
problem of setting optimal audit and penalty rates given a definition.  Section II considers the
marginal efficiency cost of funds and optimal elasticity measures as tools for defining avoidance and
evasion.  Section III considers how the tax rules themselves can be optimally drafted to limit
shelters.  In particular, it considers whether the law should use detailed rules or broad standards.
I. The Problem of Defining Avoidance
Most studies of tax avoidance and evasion are written as if we knew what these terms meant,
and the problem is analyzing the various incentives to engage in these activities.  Take for example, a
typical statement from a public finance text (a book that I otherwise very much admire),  Tresch
(2002 p. 512).
Tax avoidance refers to taxpayers taking advantage of the provisions of the tax laws to reduce
their tax liability, such as arranging to take income in the form of lightly taxed capital gains
or untaxed fringe benefits rather than as fully taxed wages and salaries.  Avoidance taxes is
legal and its consequences certain.  Tax evasion refers to hiding sources of taxable income
from the tax authorities to reduce one’s tax liability, such as not reporting gambling winnings
or failing to file a tax return when required to do so.  Evading taxes is illegal and its
consequences are uncertain; they depend on the probability of the taxpayer being caught.
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Given this definition, numerous authors, following Allingham and Sandmo (1972), have analyzed
the incentives to evade taxes.  The case these authors seem to have in mind is an individual simply
not paying taxes.  It is clear in this case that the relevant activity is evasion.
The typical corporate tax shelter case is more difficult.  It will almost always be ambiguous
whether the transaction should be treated as permissible tax reduction or not.  The transaction will
involve numerous complicated steps, and each step individually will comply with the law even
though the overall result might be egregious.  The problem facing the policymaker, whether it is a
court, Congress, or the Treasury, is whether the transaction should work as claimed.  Assuming that
there are set categories of evasion and avoidance, as is done in most of the literature, assumes the
central problem.
To put the problem in a welfarist framework, we cannot assume pre-existing definitions of
tax avoidance and evasion.  Instead, we must determine which responses to taxation will be treated
in various fashions based directly on the welfare consequences of such treatment.  For example,
working less, elaborate financial structuring, and plain old cheating are all merely responses to
taxation.  Absent some reason directly linked to social welfare, we should treat them the same. 
These activities will not be the same because the welfare consequences of allowing or disallowing
them will be different.  The class of activities that turn out to be socially optimal to punish with
criminal sanctions is what we should call evasion.  The remainder of responses to taxation, which it
is socially optimal to accept, are perfectly legal avoidance.  There is also nothing sacred about a
division of the world between evasion and avoidance.  We could alternatively divide the world in to
three, four, or any number of categories with scaled penalties for the various categories (as we
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1  An exam ple of this type of analysis is Stern (1982).  He concludes may be optimal to accept the labor/leisure
distortion of an income tax to avoid the benefits of errors in administer ing a lump sum tax.  This argum ent has basically
the same structure as the argument in the text.  Others have made similar points about analyzing all possible tax
instruments with a unified  framework.  See, for exam ple, Feldstein (1999), Slemrod (1990), Slemrod and  Kopcuk (2002).
actually do).  The task is to determine how to classify and treat the various responses to taxation
based directly on the welfare consequences.1
II. Tools for evaluating the social costs of shelters
Determining the optimal definition of avoidance and evasion is similar to the problem
considered in the economics literature of how to optimally set a tax instrument other than the tax
rate.  For example, determining which shelters work to reduce tax is the same as determining the
scope of the tax base.  Deciding that a transaction reduces tax is akin to deciding that it is not part of
the tax base.  Slemrod and Yitzhaki’s (1996) MECF and Slemrod and Kopcuk’s (2002) optimal
elasticity are designed for precisely this task.  The MECF, in particular, is an attempt to create a
simple method of determining the consequences of tax law changes through readily available data,
which makes it particularly promising.  Consider each in turn.
Slemrod and Yitzhaki’s MECF is equal to X/MR, where X is the static revenue estimate
from a small increase in the tax rate (i.e., the estimate assuming no behavioral response) and MR is
the actual estimate.  It is worth reviewing the derivation here because it is important in interpreting
its application to tax shelters.  Consider a representative taxpayer with a well-behaved utility function
and allocation of his budget that satisfies y = 3iqiXi where qi is the after-tax price of the ith
commodity and Xi is the quantity consumed.  Using Roy’s Identity, we can state the marginal burden
of a marginal change in tax rates as MB = 3iXidqi.  That is, the marginal burden is a function of the
quantities consumed and the change in prices due to a small change in the tax rate.  
The change in tax revenues from a small change in the ith tax instrument is MRi = MR/Mti
where R is total tax revenues.  If we let dti = dqi and substitute, we get MB = 3i(Xi/MRi)MR.  The
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term in the parenthetical is the MECF.  For a given small change in revenue, MR, the marginal
burden depends on the MECF.
We can extend this to include compliance costs incurred by the taxpayer and administrative
costs incurred by the government because of the change in a tax instrument.  If the ith tax
instrument is changed, the marginal burden is a function not only of the quantities consumed and
the change in tax but also of changes in compliance costs.  Therefore, we can write MB = 3iXidqi +
Ci` where Ci` is the marginal change in compliance costs from a change in the ith tax instrument. 
Similarly, the marginal revenue from a change in tax rates is reduced by any increase in
administrative costs.  Subtracting this from marginal revenue, we get MRi = MR/Mti - Ai` where Ai` is
the marginal change in administrative costs.  Substituting, we get 
MECF = (Xi + Ci`)/(MRi - Ai`)
Slemrod and Yitzhaki also extend the formula to allow corner solutions, an extension I will ignore
here.
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996, p 184) and (2001, p. 195), claim that the MECF should apply to
any tax instrument.  The concept was derived in the context of a tax on a commodity, but they argue
that the cost of a “leaked” dollar of tax revenue due to behavior changes, X - MR, is the same
regardless of its source.  Therefore, dollars lost to evasion and avoidance have the same impact as
dollars lost to other responses to taxation.  The efficiency of a change in any parameter of the tax
system, therefore, can theoretically be measured by the MECF.
The goal of the MECF measure is to provide a simple way of evaluating the efficiency
effects of the change in any tax instrument.  The key to the simplicity comes from the application of
Roy’s identity to convert utility changes to changes in consumption.  This allows us to use the static
revenue estimate, which is information necessary for generating the revenue estimates used in
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2  Both numbers must be estimated with care.  Tax revenue estimates are yearly numbers while the MECF
refers to the total (present value) change.
evaluating tax law changes.  The marginal revenue number in the denominator is also generated as
part of the tax lawmaking process.2  Therefore, estimates of the MECF should be readily available.
Turning back to shelters, suppose there is a proposal to change the tax rules so that some
particular shelter no longer generates tax benefits, and we want to measure the MECF of the
proposal.  Using the interpretation of X as the static revenue estimate, we might see a very large
number if the shelter is popular.  If there are slightly less attractive alternative shelters, however, the
actual revenue estimate, the marginal revenue, may be very small.  Once the shelter is shut down,
some individuals will give up sheltering and pay tax, but if substitute shelters are available, most
individuals will simply switch to another shelter.  This suggests that it is highly inefficient to attack
most shelters, at least on a piecemeal basis. 
This is not, however, a correct interpretation of the MECF.  The idea of using the static
revenue estimate for the numerator does not work in this context.  The MECF is derived by
assuming that the individual has consumption of X and, therefore, the burden of a small change in
the tax on X is simply $X.  Slemrod and Yitzhaki argue that we can interpret X as any response to
the tax system because taxpayers will equalize all responses at the margin.  The additional cost of
avoiding another dollar of tax through shelters will be the same as the cost of avoiding another
dollar of tax by changing the consumption bundle.  But a small increase in the tax on sheltering does
not result in an additional burden on individuals equal to the amount sheltered.  Instead, it results in
an additional burden equal to the increase in costs to enter into the next best shelter.  That is, we
should interpret X not as the static revenue estimate but the fees or other costs incurred to purchase
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3  The fees for sheltering and the amount sheltered will be equal at the margin.  But if we are measuring
marginal burden by the amount consumed, we need to look at the absolute amount of fees, not the absolute amount
sheltered.
Another way to see this point is to analogize shutting down a shelter to adding a com modity to the tax base of a
commodity tax.  Yitzhaki (1979), Wilson (1989).  The additional burden on an individual when the commodity is added
to the base  is not the amount of tax avoided  by individuals who chose that commodity because it was previously
excluded from the base (analogous to the amount of income sheltered by a tax shelter).  Instead, it is the tax on the
commodity.  In the case of shelters, the commodity is the amount spent purchasing the shelter that is being eliminated.
the shelter.  The fees and other costs are the cost of the “consumption” of the shelter, and a small
increase in the strength of anti-shelter rules results in a marginal burden of this amount. 3
The MECF, applied to tax avoidance or sheltering in this way makes more sense.  A small
increase in anti-shelter rules results in a small increase in the cost of sheltering.  The measure of this,
applying an envelop theorem like Roy’s identity, is the cost of sheltering.  The problem with this
reading of the MECF is that it is no longer based on observable data.  In particular, the costs of
sheltering include the costs of distorted financial structures and risk aversion, neither of which is
readily observable.  Thus, the MECF, when applied to shelters, loses one of its most attractive
features.  Moreover, it indicates that studies of tax dollars lost to sheltering are incomplete, and to
perform a welfare analysis (at least using the MECF measure), we need know the fees and other
costs of shelters.
The elasticity of taxable income approach is essentially the same as the MECF except that it
breaks up the marginal revenue term into two distinct terms.  The intuition, due to Feldstein (1999),
is that all tax-induced behavior entails costs that will be incurred until at the margin, the private cost
equals the tax savings.  All tax reduction behavior, therefore, has the same effect on the margin, and
we can measure overall efficiency by simply measuring the compensated elasticity of taxable income. 
For example, suppose that individuals have the option of structuring their compensation as non-
taxable fringe benefits or working less.  Both reduce taxable income.  Traditional analysis would
focus on labor elasticity to determine the efficiency effects of a labor income tax.  We should,
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however, look at the taxable income elasticity on the assumption that at the margin, the private cost
of switching cash wages into fringe benefits is equal to the costs of working less.  The change in
taxable income when the tax rate is increased measures the cost of both substitutions.  Focusing
only on labor supply would make the tax system seem too efficient because labor supply changes
less than taxable income when individuals can received tax-free fringe benefits.  
Slemrod and Kopcuk (2002) observed that the elasticity of taxable income can be
manipulated by changing tax instruments.  For example, increasing the tax base reduces the
elasticity.  Given administrative costs of using various tax instruments, we can then calculate the
optimal elasticity.  This approach would seem to lend itself naturally to tax shelters because one of
the main goals of proposals to limit shelters is to reduce the elasticity of taxable income – they
reduce avoidance opportunities by expanding the base.
Slemrod and Kopcuk (2002, equation 10) give the first order condition for setting the
strength of an arbitrary tax instrument given a linear income tax and a uniform lump sum tax.  They
break down the change in social welfare due to a change in a tax instrument into three parts.  First,
there is the change in (indirect) utility, distributionally weighted, from the change in the instrument. 
Second, there is the change in tax revenues holding elasticity fixed.  Finally, there is the change in tax
revenues due to the change in elasticity of taxable income.  Combining these, their equation 10,
loosely translated, is that at the optimum:
MV + MR (, fixed) - MR (due to change in ,) = A`
where MV is the distributionally weighted marginal indirect utility, MR is marginal revenue, , is the
elasticity of taxable income, and A` is marginal administrative costs.
If we combine the two marginal revenue terms and rearrange, we get:
Marginal utility/(MR - A’) = -1
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4  There are several other differences.  For example, the MECF formula as given here does not include
distributional weights, although these are easily added.  See Slem rod and Yitzhaki (2001).  Similarly, the elasticity measure
breaks up the revenue change into two pieces while the MECF measure simply considers the entire change in revenue. 
These d ifferences are essentially minor e lements of their derivations, and it is easy to see how the two form ulas are
essentially the same.
This is, essentially, the MECF formula with minor changes.  For example, the MECF formula uses
marginal burdens instead of marginal utility, which accounts for the change in sign.  In addition, the
MECF formula is not set at the optimum, so the MECF does not always equal 1.  The optimal
elasticity is a statement about the optimal tax structure, so it equals 1.  The MECF formula includes
compliance costs but the elasticity formula as expressed so far does not.  These differences as well as
others, are insignificant.4  The two measures are effectively the same (as they should be).
Given that the two measures are the same, the problem with measuring marginal burden will
apply.  That is, the elasticity of taxable income concept will not reduce the measurement problems
because we once again cannot rely on Roy’s identity to transform a change in utility into a simple
measure of consumption.  
The nice thing about the elasticity measure, however, it that it focuses attention on the right
variable in thinking about shelters – the effect of changing shelter rules on the elasticity of taxable
income.  When the government issues a rule that a particular transaction no longer shelters income,
it does not expect to raise revenue from taxpayers who continue to engage in that shelter.  The
revenue effects from shutting down a tax shelter, holding elasticity constant, are likely to be zero or
close to zero.  Absent tax benefits, nobody does these transactions.  All of the revenue comes from
changing the elasticity of taxable income.  
We can see, then, that the efficiency effects of attacking shelters depend on three variables. 
First, we need to know the increased fees and other costs that will be incurred by those taxpayers
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5  I have previously called this the d istortionary effect.  The idea is that when we increase the strength of anti-
shelter ru les, we make those she lters that rem ain worse.  See Weisbach (2002).
who continue to shelter.5  Second, we need to know the effects of changing the elasticity of taxable
income.  Third, we need to understand the compliance and administrative costs of various
approaches to reducing shelters.  Studies that focus on the volume of sheltering, while interesting,
do not directly determine any of the relevant variables.  Instead, they should be thought of a
suggestive of the potential revenue that attacks on shelters might yield.  We need to know more
about the fees and other costs of shelters, the elasticity effects, which relate primarily to the
availability of substitute shelters, and the compliance and administrative costs of reducing shelters.
It is easy to imagine how the avoidance/evasion type regime we have arises from this
analysis.  Begin with the simple case where there are only two classes of activities, allowable
avoidance and disallowed evasion.  Disallowed evasion is simply the class of responses to taxation
that it is efficient to prevent.  Tax rules preventing these activities have a low MECF.  Allowable
avoidance activity is the class of responses to taxation that are efficient to allow.  Tax rules that
would disallow these activities would have a high MECF.  The dividing line is where the MECF of
preventing more avoidance equal the MECF of raising money in other ways.  Disallowed evasion is
likely to include those activities that are relatively cheap to prevent or that would lose a lot of
revenue if allowed.  For example, failing to file a return or filing false returns, if allowed, would lose
substantial revenue and, therefore, must be treated as disallowed evasion.  Working less, while
potentially creating a large revenue loss, would be difficult or impossible to prevent, and, therefore,
falls into the class of allowed avoidance.
Current law uses a finer grained analysis, imposing criminal penalties for some activities and
a scaled set of non-criminal penalties for others.  There are two primary considerations in thinking
about how to scale penalties.  First, Becker (1968) suggests that we use very high criminal sanctions. 
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But considerations of risk aversion and corruption modify this to argue for lower penalties.  See, for
example, Polinksy and Shavell (1979).  This is particularly true where it is uncertain whether a
particular activity will be treated as disallowed evasion.  Second, we need to consider substitution
effects among responses to taxation.  If very high sanctions were imposed on all disallowed evasion,
a taxpayer who engages in a minor type of evasion might have no incentive to avoid more egregious
evasions.  Scaled punishments limit this effect.  Thus, we should expect a range of punishments for
responses to taxation based on the cost of preventing an activity, the revenue raised from preventing
the activity, and factors such as how well the activity can be defined.
Note also that the scope of disallowed evasion depends on the MECF of other tax
instruments.  If tax rates are high, MECF’s are likely to be higher and we should expect more
sheltering activity to be disallowed.  If there are other low MECF instruments, we might not want to
address sheltering.  We cannot say anything about shelters in the abstract without considering
alternative tax instruments.
III. Using the Structure of the Tax Law to Reduce Sheltering
The problem is translating these measures into actual policy proposals.  The measures are
helpful because they tell us what sort of data we need and perhaps provide intuitions about why the
law takes the general form that it does.  But they are a long way from, say, telling congressional
staffers whether to increase disclosure and penalties, to codify an economic substance doctrine, to
provide more resources to IRS litigation teams, or to not do anything.  The economics literature has
studied the optimal use of audits and sanctions.  It has not, however, studied how the actual drafting
of the tax law itself can reduce sheltering.  In particular, the tax law can be made more or less
complex or it can use broad anti-sheltering standards such as the economic substance doctrine. 
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6  This section is based  on Weisbach (1999).  Surrey (1969) makes a  similar argument.
7  See, for example, Bankman (2001).
These issues, like the use of audits, can and must be analyzed by examining the welfare created by
each approach.6  This task is taken up below.
Attacks on shelters often rely on vague standards, such as the business purpose, sham
transaction, or economic substance doctrines.  Under these standards, transactions that otherwise
meet the literal requirements of the law are treated as not working.  For example, under the business
purpose doctrine, transactions must have a non-tax business purpose to be respected for tax
purposes, even if the transaction otherwise meets the requirements of the tax law.  Under the
economic substance doctrine, transactions must change the economics of the taxpayer in a
meaningful way.  The exact content of these standards is uncertain, and attempts to clarify the
content often conclude that the doctrines are incoherent.7  Moreover, they seem to contradict the
literal language of the law.  The question is why these doctrines persist.
Begin by considering why we might want the tax law to use rules in most circumstances. 
Following Kaplow (1992) we can define a rule as a law which is given content before individuals act. 
Think of a speed limit that requires individuals to drive less than 55 MPH.  The 55 MPH limit is a
rule because the detailed content of the law is given prior to individuals acting.  A standard is given
content ex post, after individuals act.  Suppose the law required drivers to drive reasonably instead
of 55 MPH.  The “drive reasonably” limit is a standard because what it means to drive reasonably
will only be determined after an individual has driven and been charged with driving unreasonably.
Kaplow (1992) argues that we should choose between rules and standards to minimize the
cost of determining the content of the law.  If the law uses rules, so that its content is determined ex
ante, the government incurs the one-time cost of determining the content but it is cheap for
David A . Weisbach Page 12
individuals to look up the rule and cheap for courts or law enforcement officials to apply the law. 
For example, it is costly to determine the correct speed limit, but once it is determined it is simple to
determine whether a driver is speeding.
If, alternatively, the law uses standards so that its content is determined ex post, the
government need not incur the up front cost but it will be more expensive for individuals to
determine the content of the law and more expensive for courts or law enforcement officials to
apply the law.  For example, the government would incur a low up front cost to require drivers to
drive reasonably but it will be expensive for drivers to determine the appropriate speed and for a
court to determine whether a driver was in fact driving reasonably.  The tort system largely relies on
standards, namely that individuals must take due care.  Presumably it does this because it is cheaper
to determine due care ex post than to try to specify all the details of care ex ante.  
It is cheaper to use rules than standards for the vast majority of the tax law.  Because most
tax rules apply millions or hundreds of millions of times, it is likely that it is cheaper for the
government to incur the one-time cost of promulgating rules than for individuals to have to guess at
the content of the law.  More generally, if the law applies with great frequency, ex ante promulgation
of rules takes advantage of economies of scale incurred by the government, and, therefore, rules are
likely to be desirable.
A key assumption in this argument is that the content of the law is the same for both rules
and standards, and the only issue is how to promulgate that content at the least cost.  That is, for
minimization of promulgation costs to be the appropriate social goal, we have to believe that the
content of the law is the same, so that the benefits of some particular law are the same regardless of
whether it is promulgated as a rule or a standard.  This may often be a good first approximation. 
Standards have the advantage of more information because they occur later in time.  But rules have
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the advantage of economies of scale in determining the right content.  While the likely content
might be different in most cases, there may be no systematic pattern to the differences.  Neither
rules nor standards can be expected to be systematically more accurate or biased in one direction or
another.  Equal content might be as good or better an assumption as any other and, therefore
minimizing the cost of promulgation is a reasonable goal.
There is at least one place, however, where the differences in content between rules and
standards are likely to be systematic and to favor standards – tax shelters.  The argument is that rules
would have to be systematically more complex than standards, making the total costs of applying the
law higher with a pure rules-based approach.  
To see this, suppose that the tax law only used rules.  One would expect that in specifying
the content of most laws, it would be sufficient to provide content for common transactions.  If
uncommon ones are improperly regulated, the social losses are likely to be small because they are, by
assumption, uncommon.  This strategy does not work, however, for the tax law.  The reason is that
if a rare transaction is taxed incorrectly, there will be an opportunity to shelter income.  Once the
opportunity is discovered, the transaction will become common as taxpayers take advantage of it. 
Thus, if the tax law relied exclusively on rules, it would have to correctly specify the treatment of
rare transactions, indeed of transactions that have never yet occurred or even been considered. 
Otherwise, a purely rules-based approach will be subject to easy manipulation.
An approach that mixes rules and standards, such as current law, does not have this flaw. 
Rules can be used to cover common transactions.  If an uncommon transaction is mis-taxed and
occurs, standards can trump the rules to provide an appropriate result.  If individuals know that
standards will trump rules to provide an appropriate result, there will be no incentive to discover the
odd mis-taxed transaction.  Therefore, it is unlikely that these rare transactions will ever occur and,
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the content of the law in these odd cases need never be given.  The standards-based approach thus
avoids the complexity of a purely rules-based approach.  A mix of rules and over-riding standards
minimizes the overall cost of promulgating the tax law.  We should expect the law to take this
approach, as it does, mixing a set of detailed rules with over-riding standards.
The hard part, of course, is determining the optimal mix of rules and standards, and
specifying when exactly standards will trump rules.  I believe that failure to appreciate the
simplifying aspect of standards has led to a approach that is too rules-oriented.  In addition, the tax
bar, which has a significant impact on the drafting of the tax law, opposes the uncertainty of
standards because it impedes their ability to give tax advice.  The tax bar, in this regard, however,
poorly represents the interests of its clients.  There is no reason to believe that business taxpayers
would be significantly averse to uncertainty and good reasons to believe that increasing reliance on
standards would reduce compliance and administrative costs.  
The question of when standards should trump the usual rules is also not difficult.  One
merely needs to apply the logic of having standards.  Standards are needed when the tax rules mis-
tax a rare transaction.  Standards, therefore, should apply when the rules (or the drafters) fail to
anticipate a rare transaction and when mis-taxation of the transaction would lead to the problem of
a proliferation of the mis-taxed transaction.  Otherwise, the usual rules should govern.  The
application of this principle in any given case will be difficult, but the concept is straightforward.
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 15
References
Allingham, Michael.G. and Agnar Sandmo. Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis. Journal
of Public Economics 1 (November 1972): 323-338.
Bankman, Joseph. The Economic Substance Doctrine. University of Southern California Law Review
74 (2001): 5-30.
Becker, Gary. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy 76(2)
(1968): 169-217.
Feldstein, Martin. Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax. Review of
Economics and Statistics 81(4) (1999): 674-680.
Kaplow, Louis. Rules verus Standards: An Economic Analysis. Duke Law Journal 42 (1992): 557-
629.
Polinksy, A. Mitchell, and Shavell, Steven. The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines. American Economic Review 69 (1979): 880-891.
Slemrod, Joel. Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems. Journal of Economic Perspectives 4(1)
(1990): 157-178.
Slemrod, Joel, and Wojciech Kopczuk. The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income. Journal of Public
Economics 84 (2002): 91-112.
Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki.  The Cost of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of
Funds. International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 43(1) (1996): 172-198.
Slemrod, Joel, and Shlomo Yitzhaki, Integrating Expenditure and Tax Decisions: The Marginal
cost of Funds and the Marginal Benefit of Projects.  National Tax Journal, 54(2) (2001):
189-201.
David A . Weisbach Page 16
Slemrod, Joel and Shlomo Yitzhaki. Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration. In Alan J.
Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, ed. Handbook of Public Economics Vol. 3. Elsevier, 2002,
pp.1425-1470.
Stern, Nicholas. Optimum Taxation with Errors in Administration. Journal of Public Economics 17(2)
(1982): 181-211.
Surrey, Stanley J. Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Management
of Tax Detail. Law & Contemporary Problems 34 (1969) 673-710 .
Tresch, Richard. Public Finance, A Normative Theory. San Diego: Academic Press, 2002.
Weisbach, David. Formalism in the Tax Law. University of Chicago L. Rev. 66(1999): 860-886.
Weisbach, David. An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines. American Law and
Economics Review 4 (2002): 88-115.  
Wilson, John D. On the Optimal Tax Base for Commodity Taxation. American Economic Review 79
(5) (1989): 1196-1206.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo. A Note on Optimal Taxation and Administrative Costs. American Economic
Review 69(2) (1979): 475-480.
Readers with comments should address them to:
David A. Weisbach
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL  60637
d-weisbach@uchicago.edu
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 17
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries and Other Unpublished
Works:  An Economic Approach (July 1991)
2. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in
the Law of Tort (August 1991)
3. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (September 1991)
4. Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract (February 1992)
5. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools (February 1992)
6. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation of AIDS (April 1992)
7. Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April 1992)
8. William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Economic Analysis (July
1992)
9. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A
Quantitative Study (August 1992)
10. Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey
With An Analysis of U.S. Policy (September 1992)
11. Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts (November 1992)
12. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January 1993)
13. J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages: Cotton Spinning Cartels
in Imperial Japan (March 1993)
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law (April 1993)
15. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does) (April 1993)
16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial
Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital (August 1993)
17. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The Legal Logic to the
Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993)
18. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory
Adjudication (September 1993)
19. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law (September 1993)
20. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis (October 1993)
21. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle (March 1994)
22. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law (June 1994)
23. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis (June 1994)
24. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from Early Modern Japan
(August 1994)
25. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows (August 1994)
David A . Weisbach Page 18
26. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property
Protection of Software (August 1994)
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness, (October 1994)
28. David Friedman, More Justice for Less Money: A Step Beyond Cimino (December
1994)
29. Daniel Shaviro, Budget Deficits and the Intergenerational Distribution of Lifetime
Consumption (January 1995)
30. Douglas G. Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages (February 1995)
31. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites, and Geoffrey P. Miller, Explaining Deviations from
the Fifty Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation
(March 1995)
32. Geoffrey P. Miller, Das Kapital: Solvency Regulation of the American Business
Enterprise (April 1995)
33. Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract (August 1995)
34. J. Mark Ramseyer, Public Choice (November 1995)
35. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property in an Age of Software and Biotechnology
(November 1995)
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles (January 1996)
37. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes:
Econometrics from Japan (January 1996)
38. Richard A. Epstein, Transaction Costs and Property Rights: Or Do Good Fences Make
Good Neighbors? (March 1996)
39. Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State (May 1996)
40. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Legal Disputes Over the
Ownership of Works of Art and Other Collectibles (July 1996)
41. John R. Lott, Jr. and David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry
Concealed Handguns (August 1996)
42. Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs (September 1996)
43. G. Baird, The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law and Economics
of Financially Distressed Firms (March 1997)
44. Richard A. Posner, Community, Wealth, and Equality (March 1997)
45. William M. Landes, The Art of Law and Economics: An Autobiographical Essay
(March 1997)
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law (April 1997)
47. John R. Lott, Jr. and Kermit Daniel, Term Limits and Electoral Competitiveness:
Evidence from California=s State Legislative Races (May 1997)
48. Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms (June 1997)
49. Richard A. Epstein, Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through the
Lens of Laissez-Faire (August 1997) 
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 19
50. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law) (December 1997) 
51. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges (January 1998) 
52. John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures are
Increasing: The Government is Getting Bigger (February 1998) 
53. Richard A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis
of Law (March 1998) 
54. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are
Homeowners Better Citizens? (April 1998) 
55. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law
and Economics (May 1998)
56. John R. Lott, Jr., Does a Helping Hand Put Others At Risk?: Affirmative Action, Police
Departments, and Crime (May 1998)
57. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (June 1998)
58. Jonathan M. Karpoff and John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determinants,
Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact of Supreme Court and Congressional Attempts
to Limit Awards (July 1998)
59. Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle (August 1998)
60. John R. Lott, Jr., How Dramatically Did Women=s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope
of Government? (September 1998)
61. Kevin A. Kordana and Eric A. Posner, A Positive Theory of Chapter 11 (October 1998)
62. David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law
(November 1998)
63. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law
(November 1998)
64. John R. Lott, Jr., Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism (December
1998)
65. Cass R. Sunstein, Private Broadcasters and the Public Interest: Notes Toward A AThird
Way@ (January 1999)
66. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence (February 1999)
67. Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, Douglas Lichtman, Shared Information Goods
(February 1999)
68. Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise (February 1999)
69. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with
Particular Application to Sexual Harassment (March 1999)
70. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically? (March 1999)
71. Jonathan M. Karpoff, John R. Lott, Jr., and Graeme Rankine, Environmental
Violations, Legal Penalties, and Reputation Costs (March 1999)
72. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 1999)
David A . Weisbach Page 20
73. John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shooting, Bombings,
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law
Enforcement (April 1999) 
74. Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2=s Incorporation Strategy:
A Preliminary Study (May 1999)
75. Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing Privacy: and Putting It Back Together Again (May
1999)
76. William M. Landes, Winning the Art Lottery: The Economic Returns to the Ganz
Collection (May 1999)
77. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal
Deterrence? (June 1999)
78. Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run Growth in Obesity as a
Function of Technological Change (June 1999)
79. David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax (August 1999)
80. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error
(August 1999)
81. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman, Are Juries Less Erratic than
Individuals? Deliberation, Polarization, and Punitive Damages (September 1999)
82. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons (September 1999)
83. Richard A. Posner, The Theory and Practice of Citations Analysis, with Special
Reference to Law and Economics (September 1999)
84. Randal C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel (October 1999)
85. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis (October 1999)
86. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal
Decisionmaking: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy (October 1999)
87. Gertrud M. Fremling and Richard A. Posner, Market Signaling of Personal
Characteristics (November 1999)
88. Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When
Preferences Are Distorted (November 1999)
89. Richard A. Posner, Orwell versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy, and Satire
(November 1999)
90. David A. Weisbach, Should the Tax Law Require Current Accrual of Interest on
Derivative Financial Instruments? (December 1999)
91. Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization (December 1999)
92. Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (January 2000)
93. Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, and Richard Zeckhauser, Simplicity and Complexity
in Contracts (January 2000) 
94. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd=s Legacy and Blackstone=s Ghost
(February 2000) 
95. David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars: The
Severity Shift (February 2000)
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 21
96. Richard A. Posner and Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions (March 2000)
97. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies (April 2000) 
98. Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Solidarity in Consumption (May 2000)
99. David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Laws (May 2000,
revised May 2002) 
100. Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work (June 2000) 
101. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error (June 2000)
102. Robert H. Frank and Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position
(August 2000) 
103. Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions (September 2000) 
104. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles (October 2000) 
105. Jack Goldsmith and Alan Sykes,  The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Internet
(November 2000)
106. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy (November 2000)
107. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent
System (November 2000)
108. Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International
Relations:  A Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000)
109. William Meadow and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts (December 2000)
110. Saul Levmore, Conjunction and Aggregation (December 2000)
111. Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options and Compensation Norms (December 2000)
112. Richard A. Epstein and Alan O. Sykes, The Assault on Managed Care:  Vicarious
Liability, Class Actions and the Patient=s Bill of Rights (December 2000)
113. William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art:  An
Economic Approach (December 2000)
114. Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule (January 2001)
115. George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital (January
2001)
116. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption (February 2001)
117. Richard Hynes and Eric A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance
(February 2001)
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Academic Fads and Fashions (with Special Reference to Law)
(March 2001)
119. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis:  A Positive Political
Theory Perspective (April 2001)
120. Douglas G. Baird, Does Bogart Still Get Scale?  Rights of Publicity in the Digital Age
(April 2001)
121. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights and the
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganization (April 2001)
122. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters (May 2001)
David A . Weisbach Page 22
123. William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished?
(May 2001)
124. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights?  Lessons from South Africa (May 2001)
125. Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner, and Alvin E. Roth, The Market
for Federal Judicial Law Clerks (June 2001) 
126. Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making (June 2001)
127. Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks after ATA (June 2001)
128.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear (June 2001)
129. Richard A. Epstein, In and Out of Public Solution:  The Hidden Perils of Property
Transfer (July 2001)
130. Randal C. Picker, Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft:  The Declining Need for
Centralized Coordination in a Networked World (July 2001)
131. Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments (July 2001)
132. Eric A. Posner, Courts Should Not Enforce Government Contracts (August 2001)
133. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions (August 2001)
134. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons:Parking and Stopping on the
Commons (August 2001)
135. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic (September 2001)
136. Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of Property
Exemption Laws (September 2001)
137. Eric A. Posner and George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an
Incomplete Contracts Perspective (September 2001)
138. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emptions, Worst Cases, and Law (November
2001)
139. Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Throwing Good Money after Bad? Board
Connections and Conflicts in Bank Lending (December 2001)
140. Alan O. Sykes, TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
ASolution@ (February 2002)
141. Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and Indignation (February
2002)
142. Daniel N. Shaviro and David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It Wrong in Compaq
v. Commissioner (February 2002) (Published in Tax Notes, January 28, 2002)
143. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and
Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System (March 2002, Journal of Legal Studies
2002)
144. Richard A. Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy:  Its Unintended and Intended Consequences
(March 2002, forthcoming Cato Journal, summer 2002)
145. David A. Weisbach, Thinking Ouside the Little Boxes (March 2002, Texas Law Review)
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 23
146. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades:  Success or
Failure (March 2002)
147. Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy:  The Case of Digital Distribution (April
2002, The Antitrust Bulletin)
148. David A. Weisbach, Taxes and Torts in the Redistribution of Income (April 2002,
Coase Lecture February 2002)
149. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (April 2002)
150. Robert W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving
Federal Regulation?  Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis (April 2002)
151. Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence (May 2002, updated January
2003)
152. Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material (May
2002)
153. Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:  What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002)
154. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (July
2002)
155. Anne Gron and Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer? (July 2002)
156. Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002)
157. Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002)
158. Cass R. Sunstein, Avoiding Absurdity? A New Canon in Regulatory Law (with Notes
on Interpretive Theory) (August 2002)
159. Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and
Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright (September 2002)
160. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War (September 2002)
161 Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort
and Contract Law (September 2002)
162. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks (September 2002)
163. David A. Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot? (September 2002)
164. Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (September 2002)
165. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (October 2002)
166. Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the Standard for Preliminary Relief (October
2002)
167. Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom (November 2002)
168. Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November
2002)
169. Avraham D. Tabbach, Criminal Behavior, Sanctions, and Income Taxation: An
Economic Analysis (November 2002)
David A . Weisbach Page 24
170. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of “Old” Public Health: The Legal Framework for the
Regulation of Public Health (December 2002)
171. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights (December 2002)
172. David A. Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates (December
2002)
173. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy (December 2002)
174. Richard A. Epstein, Into the Frying Pan: Standing and Privity under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Beyond (December 2002)
175. Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps (January 2003)
176. David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-
Term Assets (January 2003)
177. Randal C. Picker, Understanding Statutory Bundles: Does the Sherman Act Come
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act? (January 2003)
178. Douglas Lichtman and Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local Telecommunications:
Iowa Utilities and Verizon (January 2003)
179. William Landes and Douglas Lichtman, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective (February 2003)
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics (March 2003)
181. Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks (March 2003)
182. Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion (April
2003)
183. Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary” History of Property and Liberty (April 2003)
184. Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
185. Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalizm Is Not an Oxymoron
(May 2003)
186. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (May 2003)
187. Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence (May 2003)
188. Alan O. Sykes, International Trade and Human Rights: An Economic Perspective
(May 2003)
189. Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
190. Richard A. Epstein, Trade Secrets as Private Property: Their Constitutional Protection
(June 2003)
191. Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay (June 2003)
192. Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems
(July 2003)
193. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Decreasing Liability Contracts (July 2003)
194. David A. Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs (September 2003)
Corporate Tax Avoidance Page 25
195. William L. Meadow, Anthony Bell, and Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Memories:
What Was the Standard of Care for Administering Antenatal Steroids to Women in
Preterm Labor between 1985 and 2000? (September 2003)
196. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage (September 2003)
197. Randal C. Picker, The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content
(September 2003)
198. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation (September 2003)
199. Avraham D. Tabbach, The Effects of Taxation on Income-Producing Crimes with
Variable Leisure Time (October 2003)
200. Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
201. Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003) 
202. David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
